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 THIRD PARTIES 
 Personal and 
proprietary tenancies
 
 Mark Pawlowski asks whether a Bruton tenancy can bind 
third parties  
Mark Pawlowski is a 
barrister and professor 
of property law in the 
department of law at the 
University of Greenwich
F
ew property lawyers would argue 
with the general proposition 
that a tenancy creates a 
property interest in land. AĞ er all, 
a lease is an estate in land and, like 
the freehold estate, generates a legal 
right to exclusive possession of land 
binding against the whole world. This 
proposition, however, was modiÞ ed in 
Bruton v London & Quadrant Housing 
Trust [2000], where the House of Lords 
ruled that a tenancy is no more than 
a consensually binding agreement 
between landlord and tenant. 
That tenancy will only give 
rise to a proprietary interest in land 
if the grantor itself has a suĜ  cient 
interest, out of which it has granted 
the proprietary interest. If, therefore, 
as in Bruton, the grantor is itself a 
licensee with no legal title to the land, 
it cannot grant a leasehold estate and 
the so-called tenant holds only a 
personal tenancy that binds only 
the immediate landlord.
The notion that some leases will 
be proprietary while others may be 
purely personal has been highlighted 
recently in London Development Agency 
v Nidai & ors [2009], where the purely 
personal nature of the tenancy was 
held to prove fatal to a claim to 
possession brought by the freehold 
owner of the land. 
Third parties
Strictly speaking, the question 
whether this form of personal tenancy 
binds third parties was leĞ  open in 
Bruton, although Sir Brian Neill (in 
his dissenting judgment in the Court 
of Appeal) did conclude that the 
tenancy Mr Bruton had acquired in 
that case against the Housing Trust 
would not have aě ected the rights of 
the Council as freeholder. The point 
was addressed post-Bruton in Kay v 
Lambeth London Borough Council [2004] 
and Islington London Borough Council v 
Green and OShea [2004]. In both of these 
cases, the Court of Appeal conÞ rmed 
that a personal tenancy granted by 
someone with no more than a licence 
is binding on that person (as licensee), 
but not on the licensor (the freeholder), 
who is not a party to the contractual 
tenancy. 
More recently, the House of Lords 
in Kay v Lambeth London Borough 
Council concluded that a Bruton 
subtenancy does not survive the 
surrender of a head tenancy made 
between the immediate landlord and 
the freeholder. Because the personal 
subtenancy is not a derivative interest 
created by the immediate landlord out 
of the estate created by the freeholder, 
a surrender of the head tenancy will 
not turn the Bruton tenant (with only 
personal rights against their immediate 
landlord) into the freeholders tenant, 
or give them any rights against the 
freeholder. 
The notion, therefore, that a Bruton 
tenancy does not bind third parties is 
now Þ rmly rooted in the case law. 
Nidai: the facts
The claimant sought possession of 
two shops in Lewisham, London. 
The shops had been built over a 
river using a raĞ  of reinforced joists 
which rested on the retaining walls 
of the river. Three agreements were 
‘A personal tenancy granted 
by someone with no more 
than a licence is binding on 
that person (as licensee), 
but not on the licensor (the 
freeholder), who is not a 
party to the contractual 
tenancy.’
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entered into between various parties 
in order to build the shops. The Þ rst 
(the bridge agreement) involved a 
bridge over the river and was made 
between certain individuals who 
were referred to as the licensees and 
the local authority. Under this 
agreement, consent was given for 
the erection and maintenance by the 
licensees of certain works and 
buildings over the river and in 
contact with the bridge. Under the 
second agreement (the retaining walls 
agreement), which concerned the 
retaining walls of the river, the local 
authority permiĴ ed the erection of the 
shops on the retaining walls. The third 
agreement (the river agreement) related 
to the span of the river itself, and 
involved the Earl of Dartmouth (the 
owner at the time) granting a licence 
in respect of the land. This licence was 
later assigned to a company which 
(in 2002) granted a lease of one of the 
shops to the Þ rst defendant. In 2005 the 
third defendant took an assignment 
of a lease of the other shop granted by 
the company (in 2003) to the second 
defendant. 
In 2006 the claimant purchased 
the land from the Earl and sought 
possession of the shops, arguing 
that the company had only licences 
and, therefore, no legal title to 
grant the purported leases. The 
defendants responded by contending 
that the bridge agreement and 
retaining walls agreement conferred 
exclusive possession of the land 
and that, therefore, they should be 
characterised as building leases (not 
licences). Alternatively, they claimed 
that the river agreement was not a 
bare licence but was a licence coupled 
with an interest in property. On this 
basis, the company, it was argued, 
had suĜ  cient legal interest to confer 
exclusive possession on the Þ rst and 
second defendants, binding on the 
claimant.
The ruling
The deputy judge concluded that 
neither the bridge agreement nor the 
retaining walls agreement had the 
necessary indicia of a legal lease in 
order to bind the claimant. Although 
both agreements reserved a rent, it 
was diĜ  cult to construe either as 
having been intended to create an 
interest in land and to grant exclusive 
possession of it. The bridge agreement 
was primarily concerned with the 
grant of permission to erect a structure 
which might interfere with the 
integrity of the bridge, and to regulate 
that arrangement. Similarly, the 
retaining walls agreement was simply 
to permit the erection of the premises 
The notion that a Bruton tenancy does not 
bind third parties is now ﬁ rmly rooted in the 
case law.
 For a FREE sample copy: call us on 020 7396 9313 or e-mail orders@legalease.co.uk
 Saves you both time and money
 Monthly updates on: 
• Commercial
• Conveyancing
• Crime
• Employment
• Family
• Land
• Landlord and tenant – commercial
• Landlord and tenant – residential
• Personal injury
• Planning and environment
• Procedure
• Professional
• Tax – VAT
• Wills, probate and administration
PLJ234 p19-21 Pawlowski.indd   20 14/08/2009   20:58:34
Property Law Journal 2124 August 2009
THIRD PARTIES
on the retaining walls of the river. It 
was thus concerned with permission 
to use the retaining walls for support 
and to deal with their maintenance. 
At its highest, therefore, the agreement 
could only be characterised as a grant 
of an easement of support. So far as the 
river agreement was concerned, this 
too was only a bare licence, since it 
could not be construed as a licence 
coupled with a separate and distinct 
interest in land.
The deputy judge held that even 
if that conclusion were wrong, the 
claimant was still entitled to possession 
for two quite independent reasons. 
First, almost the whole of the premises 
comprising the shops was built on or 
over the air-space above the bed of the 
river. By contrast, the only rights in 
respect of the shops were vested in the 
company by virtue of the assignment 
of the river agreement, which related 
solely to the land directly above 
the retaining walls. The inevitable 
conclusion, therefore, was that neither 
of the defendants would be entitled 
to enter the premises which were 
the subject of their purported leases. 
Secondly, the company did not purport 
to grant a demise of the substructure 
of the shops (which was expressly 
excluded from the leases). Thus, even 
if the agreements were to be construed 
as leases, they would have no eě ect 
in relation to anything forming the 
subject-maĴ er of the purported demise 
to the defendants.
Commentary
The outcome of Nidai was that 
any rights which the Þ rst and 
third defendants may have had to 
occupy the shops ceased when the 
claimant purchased the freehold of 
the land in 2006. 
The ruling in Bruton is not 
mentioned in the judgment, 
presumably because it would not 
have availed the defendants to argue 
for a Bruton tenancy in this case since 
this would have bound only the 
grantor company and not the claimant 
third party. It was critical for the 
defendants to establish that they had 
proprietary interests in land and 
not just personal rights arising from 
contract. That said, it is apparent that 
both defendants had the beneÞ t of 
leases in the Bruton sense in so far 
as they were tenants regardless of 
whether the company had any legal 
interest in the premises. This appears 
to have been common ground between 
the parties, although it is, perhaps, 
a liĴ le unfortunate that the deputy 
judge did not make speciÞ c reference 
to the relevance of Bruton in deÞ ning 
the legal status of the defendants more 
clearly. The conclusion in the judgment 
(at paragraph 51) that the company 
did not have an interest in land which 
entitled them to grant the leases is 
correct only if interpreted to mean that 
the defendants did not have legal leases 
conferring exclusive possession capable 
of binding the whole world. 
Another issue not speciÞ cally 
canvassed in Nidai is whether the 
Bruton tenancy has the potential to 
bind third parties as an interest 
capable of being overridden under 
paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Land 
Registration Act (LRA) 2002. It has 
been held, for example, that an interest 
of a tenant under a mere agreement 
for a lease is an overriding interest 
under the former s70(1)(g) LRA 1925 
if the tenant is in possession or in 
receipt of rent and proÞ ts: Grace 
Rymer Investments Ltd v Waite 
[1958], at 849, and Greaves 
Organisation Ltd v Stanhope Gate 
Property Co Ltd [1973]. 
Interestingly, the leases in 
Nidai were granted to the Þ rst 
and third defendants in 2002 and 
2003, respectively, while the Earl of 
Dartmouths title to the land was Þ rst 
registered in 2004. The claimant third 
party, as mentioned earlier, bought 
the land in 2006. So is it conceivable 
that the Bruton (personal) tenancies 
would have bound the claimant, 
despite not being legal leases (in the 
orthodox sense of creating estate 
in land), on the basis that they had 
overriding status? Paragraph 2 of 
Schedule 3 to LRA 2002 confers 
overriding status on an interest 
belonging to a person in actual 
occupation of the land. This wording 
diě ers from that contained in s70(1)(g) 
LRA 1925, which referred to the rights 
of every person in actual occupation. 
Interestingly, however, even under this 
more relaxed formulation, personal 
rights of an occupier were not given 
overriding status: Provincial Bank Ltd v 
Ainsworth [1965]. In particular, a bare 
or contractual licence was held not 
to qualify: Strand Securities v Caswell 
[1965]. 
Although there is some scope for 
arguing that the Bruton tenancy creates 
some form of quasi-estate in favour of 
the tenant, the beĴ er view (particularly 
in the light of Green, above) is that the 
Bruton tenant has no estate of any kind 
in the land. If this is right, then there is 
no question of such a tenancy binding 
third parties with overriding status. 
Indeed, without any form of quasi-
estate, there is nothing to distinguish 
this form of personal tenancy from a 
contractual licence. Like the contractual 
licensee, the Bruton tenant has no power 
to create a proprietary estate out of the 
land or, for that maĴ er, to carve out a 
subtenancy out of his own personal 
right of occupation: see Goldsack v Shore 
[1950], at 714 (contractual licensee held 
to have no power to create sub-licence). 
The Bruton tenancy simply becomes the 
conferment of exclusive occupation by 
another name. ■
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